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Product Liability after Woodill v. Parke Davis:
The Failure to Warn as a Basis for Recovery
INTRODUCTION

Under well established principles of strict liability in tort, a
manufacturer is responsible for the damage caused by any product
that the manufacturer markets in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user.' There is no universally accepted standard, however, that allows a court to identify a defective, unreasonably dangerous product.2 Most courts agree that a flawed or
impure product is defective and unreasonably dangerous.' Even a
flawlessly manufactured product, not "defective" in the traditional
sense, may be judicially classified as defective and unreasonably
dangerous if a manufacturer fails to adequately warn the consumer
of risks or dangers associated with the product's use." The controL. In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965), the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the theory of strict liability in tort. See infra notes 50-59 and accompanying text. The views expressed in the Suvada opinion coincide with the position taken in
§ 402A of the American Law Institute revised

RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF TORTS

approved

in May 1964. 32 Ill. 2d at 621, 210 N.E.2d at 187. The doctrine of strict liability, as stated in
the Restatement, provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty]
to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593, 597, 600 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
Birnbaum]; Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 367, 373 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Traynor); Wade, On the Nature
of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 829-33 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Wade, Strict Liability for Products].
3. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599.
4. Warnings are required under the circumstances discussed in comments h and j to §
402A. RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment h (1965) provides in pertinent part:
A product is not in a defective condition when it is safe for normal handling and
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versy arises when a manufacturer fails to give a warning because
the manufacturer does not know and has no reason to know of a
danger associated with the use of a product. A number of courts,
expansively applying strict liability theory, have held the manufacturer liable despite the manufacturer's inability to know of the
risk.6 Reaching a contrary result, Illinois rejected the broad interconsumption. If the injury results from abnormal handling, as where a bottled
beverage is knocked against a radiator to remove the cap, or from abnormal preparation for use, as where too much salt is added to food, or from abnormal consumption, as where a child eats too much candy and is made ill, the seller is not
liable. Where, however, he [the seller] has reason to anticipate that danger may
result from a particular use, as where a drug is sold which is safe only in limited
doses, he may be required to give adequate warning of the danger (see comment
j), and a product sold without such warning is in a defective condition ...
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965) provides:
In order to prevent the product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller
may be required to give directions or warning, on the container, as to its use. The
seller may reasonably assume that those with common allergies, as for example to
eggs or strawberries, will be aware of them, and he is not required to warn against
them. Where, however, the product contains an ingredient to which a substantial
number of the population are allergic, and the ingredient is one whose danger is
not generally known, or if known is one which the consumer would reasonably not
expect to find in the product, the seller is required to give warning against it, if he
has knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human skill and
foresight should have knowledge, of the presence of the ingredient and the danger.
Likewise in the case of poisonous drugs, or those unduly dangerous for other reasons, warning as to use may be required.
But a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in
them, which are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive
quantity, or over a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger,
is generally known and recognized. Again the dangers of alcoholic beverages are an
example, as are also those of foods containing such substances as saturated fats,
which may over a period of time have a deleterious effect upon the human heart.
Where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it will be read
and heeded; and a product bearing such a warning, which is safe for use if it is
followed, is not in defective condition, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
Leading decisions that recognize that the failure to warn can serve as a basis for strict
liability in tort are: Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376, 379 (9th Cir. 1974); Alman
Bros. Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v. Diamond Laboratories, Inc., 437 F.2d 1295, 1302-03 (5th
Cir. 1971); Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth
Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121, 126-30 (9th Cir. 1968); Tuscon Indus., Inc. v. Schwartz, 108
Ariz. 464, 468, 501 P.2d 936, 940-41 (1972); Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App.
2d 44, 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965); Crane v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855,
860-61, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754, 757 (1963).
For comprehensive listings of strict liability failure to warn cases, see L.R. FRUmsR & M.I.
FRIEDMAN, 2 PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][f][vi] (Supp. 1981); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 239; 63
Am. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 131 (1972).
5. States that hold a manufacturer strictly liable for the failure to warn of unknowable
dangers have concluded that it is appropriate to impose liability even when a manufacturer
is excusably unaware of the extent of the danger associated with the use of the product. The
leading case adopting this position is Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d
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pretation of strict liability theory adopted by those courts and
found knowledge to be a prerequisite for liability.6
In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 7 the Illinois Supreme Court
refused to impose strict liability for a manufacturer's failure to
warn of unknowable risks or dangers. The Woodill court held that
a plaintiff must plead and prove that the manufacturer knew or
should have known of the danger whenever it is alleged that a
product is defective and unreasonably dangerous because it lacks
appropriate warnings.8 By expressly limiting recovery under strict

1033 (1974). The plaintiff in Phillips was injured while manually feeding fiberboard into a
sanding machine. Id. at 487, 525 P.2d at 1034. The sander was designed for automatic feeding, but no warning that manual feeding could be dangerous accompanied the machine. Id.
at 490, 525 P.2d at 1035. The court began its analysis by emphasizing that in a strict liability case, the condition of the product, not the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct,
is at issue. Id. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039. See also Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal
Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 794 (8th Cir. 1977); Dougherty v. Hooker Chem. Corp., 540 F.2d 174,
177 (3d Cir. 1976); Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
Further analysis was based on the premise that a product could be unreasonably dangerous
because it lacked appropriate warnings, even though the seller acted reasonably in selling
the product without a warning. 269 Or. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039. The court, therefore, formulated a test for determining the dangerousness of the product as distinguished from the
seller's culpability. Id. The Phillips test assumed that the seller knew of the product's propensity to injure as it did, and then asked whether, with that knowledge, the seller would
have been negligent in selling the product without a warning. Id. The test was based upon
the proposals of Professors Wade and Keeton. Keeton, Products Liability - Inadequacy of
Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 403-04, 407-08 (1970); Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 834-35, 839-40; Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw.
L.J. 5, 15-17 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers. See infra
notes 125-33 and accompanying text.
The Phillips analysis has been accepted by several other states. Anderson v. Heron Eng.
Co., 198 Colo. 391, 398, 604 P.2d 674, 679 (1979); Union Supply Co. v. Pust, 196 Colo. 162,
173, 583 P.2d 276, 283 (1978); Hamilton v. Hardy, 37 Colo. App. 375, 384, 549 P.2d 1099,
1107 (1976); Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc. 87 N.J. 229, 237-40, 432 A.2d 925, 929-31
(1981); Little v. PPG Indus., Inc., 19 Wash. App. 812, 820-22, 579 P.2d 940, 945-47 (1978);
aff'd as modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979); Kimble v. Waste Systems Int'l Inc.,
23 Wash. App. 331, 335-37, 595 P.2d 569, 572 (1979); Haugen v. Minnesota Mining and Mfg.
Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 387, 550 P.2d 71, 76 (1976). Cf. Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa.
547, 558, 391 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1978); Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 9697, 337 A.2d 893, 899-900 (1975).
A recent opinion by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc.,
87 N.J. 229, 432 A.2d 925 (1981), carefully reviewed the Phillips reasoning and identified
what the court perceived to be a trend toward adoption of the Phillips analysis. The court
concluded that the essential difference between negligence and strict liability is that under
strict liability, the seller's knowledge is presumed; under negligence, the standard is what
the manufacturer knew or should have known. Id. at 237-40, 432 A,2d at 929-31. The court
adopted the Phillips test because of its focus upon this essential distinction. Id.
6. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
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liability theory, and by basing the limitation on a defendant's
knowledge, the Woodill decision appears to incorporate elements
of fault into Illinois strict liability law.
This note will evaluate the impact of Woodill on the theory of
strict tort liability in Illinois. Initially, a basis for distinguishing
types of product deficiencies will be presented. The Illinois cases
preceding Woodill that developed the doctrine of strict liability
will then be reviewed. Finally, the Woodill opinion will be summarized and analyzed.
TYPES OF PRODUCT DEFECTS

The theory of strict liability in tort is based on two propositions:
a manufacturer should only be liable for harm caused by a product
that is in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer, and liability should be imposed even if the manufacturer's conduct is without fault.' A product defect may be the result of a manufacturing accident, a deficient design, or the failure
to provide adequate warnings during the marketing process. 10 The
standard for imposing liability, although not theoretically tied to
the origin of the product defect, is in practice, directly related to
the nature of the defect in the product.1
Manufacturing Defects
When a manufacturing accident occurs, a physically flawed or
impure product is unintentionally produced. 2 If a product has a
manufacturing defect, it reaches the consumer in a condition different from the condition which was intended by the manufacturer. Typically, the product reaches the consumer in a condition
that is more dangerous than the manufacturer intended.1 3 The

9.

See supra note 1.

10. Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in ProductsLiability Law - A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REV. 579, 585 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Keeton]; Montgomery & Owen,
Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Lbility for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 811 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Montgomery & Owen].
11. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599, 648; Wade, supra note 2, at 831-32, 836-37.
12. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599; Montgomery & Owen, supra note 10, at 811; Wade,
Strict Liability of Manufacturers,supra note 5, at 14; Wade, Strict Liability for Products,
supra note 2, at 825, 830-31.
13. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599; Keeton, supra note 10, at 586; Pratt & Parnon,
Diagnosis of a Legal Headache: Liability for Unforeseeable Defects in Drugs, 53 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 517, 519 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Pratt & Parnon]; Wade, Strict Liability for
Products, supra note 2, at 830; Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 551 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wade, Design Defects].
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standard by which the defective units are identified is a standard
knowingly set by the manufacturer and embodied in each of the
non-defective units produced.' 4 Units containing a manufacturing
defect can be isolated from the rest of the product line because
they do not meet normal standards. 15 Only the abnormal units are
defective and unreasonably dangerous; the rest of the product line
is safe for use.'6 Manufacturing defects cannot be entirely eliminated because available technology limits the manufacturer's abil-7
ity to identify every abnormal product before the product is used.1
The imposition of liability without fault in this situation is a clasthe loss to the
sic application of strict liability theory, allocating
8
one creating the risk and receiving the profit.'
Design Defects
When a product is defective because its design is deficient, the
defect is ordinarily a result of deliberate management decisions. 9
Manufacturers make conscious design choices after evaluating the
benefits, costs, and risks associated with each product feature.2 0
Choosing a design may be difficult because the same product attribute that presents a risk of harm to one user, may benefit another
user. 2 1 Moreover, reducing the possibility that a design might be
harmful may either affect other useful product features or may be
too costly. 22 Whatever choice is made, the product used by the con-

sumer is designed in the manner intended by the manufacturer. 3
Any dangers associated with product design, therefore, are present
in every unit, not just a few units, as is the case with a manufac-

turing defect. 24 No unintentional flaw or variation from a norm is

14. Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1974), Model
Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,721 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
UPLA]; Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599; Traynor, supra note 2, at 367.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 647.
18. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Wade, supra note
2, at 825.
19. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599, 648.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 599-600.
22. Id.
23. Noel, Products Defective Because of Inadequate Directions or Warnings, 23 Sw.
L.J. 256, 257 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Noel]; Pratt & Parnon, supra note 13, at 519;
Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 830; Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 5, at 14-15; Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 519.
24. See supra notes 13-17 and accompanying text.
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involved in a design case. Consequently, a design defect cannot be
identified in the same way in which a manufacturing defect can be
identified.20
In deciding whether to impose strict liability for a design defect,
a court reviews the same factors that should have been considered
by the manufacturer when the product was originally designed. 6
These factors include overall product utility, the availability of a
safer substitute product that would meet the same need, and the
manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe product characteristic without impairing the product's usefulness or making the product too expensive. 7 User safety factors, including the obviousness
of the risk, the user's ability to avoid the danger by carefully using
the product, and the likelihood of serious injury, are also considered. 28 In balancing the manufacturer-oriented factors against the
user-oriented factors, the court implicitly judges the reasonableness of the product design and the reasonableness of the consumer's use, allocating the loss accordingly. In practice, strict liability is imposed only when, after carefully balancing risks and
alternatives, a court finds the manufacturer's design choices to be
improper and, therefore, the product to be defective and unreasonably dangerous to the user.2 9 When a design is judged defective,
the entire product line is affected.80
Failure to Warn Defects
A product that is flawlessly manufactured and properly designed
may be marketed in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user, if it does not adequately warn the user of the potential
dangers that accompany the use of the product."' A warning de25.

Id.

26. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 599-600, 610; Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra
note 2, at 834-38; Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 5, at 17.
27. Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 834-38; Wade, Strict Liability
of Manufacturers, supra note 5, at 17.
28. Id.
29. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 600, 610, 648; Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra
note 2, at 837.
30. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 648. The economic impact of such a judgment may be
substantial. See Noel, supra note 23, at 258.
31. See supra note 4. See also Keeton, supra note 10 at 586; Noel, supra note 23, at
264-74; Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 842; Note, The State of the Art
Defense in Products Liability: "Unreasonably Dangerous" to the Injured Consumer, 18
DuQ. L. REV. 915, 927 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, State of the Art Defense]; Note,
The Liability of Pharmaceutical Manufacturers for Unforeseen Adverse Drug Reactions,
48 FORDHAM L. REV. 735, 743-44 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Drug Reactions].
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fect, like a design defect, affects every unit in a product line."2 A
warning defect is also similar to a design defect in that it cannot be
identified in the way that a manufacturing defect can be identified. 3 A product with inadequate use or safety warnings is both
produced and marketed in the condition intended by the
manufacturer."
A manufacturer's failure to warn of a particular danger may be
the result of either a deliberate decision not to warn or the failure
to anticipate the possibility of danger.8 A manufacturer might deliberately decide not to warn of a danger known to be associated
with the use of a product because the manufacturer believes that
the risk of harm is either negligible or obvious.36 Alternatively, the
manufacturer might believe that an additional warning would decrease the effectiveness of more important warnings. 3 In some situations a manufacturer might decide not to include a warning simply because it would decrease the attractiveness of the product. 88
A manufacturer might fail to anticipate the possibility of danger
and, therefore, unintentionally fall to give a warning. Because of a
failure to properly research the product, a manufacturer may be
unaware of a danger about which it should have known."9 A manufacturer may also be unaware of a danger only because the danger
was technologically unknowable, given the state of the art.4 °
Even if a warning is included with a product, the content of the
warning might be inadequate or the format chosen to convey the
message to the consumer might be ineffective.4 1 A warning might
be insufficient, for example, if it did not specify the risk, if it were
inconsistent with the way which the product would be used, if it
did not give the reason for the warning, or if it did not reach foreseeable users.'
32. Noel, supra note 23, at 257-61.
33. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
34. Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 830.
35. See Twerski, Weinstein, Donahue, & Pickler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in
Products Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. Rav. 495 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Twerski].
36. Id. at 514-17, 521-24.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Note, Drug Reactions, supra note 31, at 745.
40. Id.
41. Noel, supra note 23, at 283-88; Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at
842.
42. Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 412 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1980); Noel,
supra note 23, at 283-88; Pratt & Parnon, supra note 13, at 521.
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In-determining whether to impose strict liability for a warning
defect, a court must weigh the foreseeability of the circumstances
under which harm occurred, the obviousness of the danger, and the
seriousness of the injury.43 A warning defect exists when, due to
the language selected or omitted by the manufacturer, the court
finds that the consumer was not adequately advised of the potential dangers associated with the use of the product." Unlike manufacturing or design defects, which involve physical product flaws or
characteristics, warning defects are defects in communication.4
Since the number of feasible warnings that a product could have is
potentially unlimited,4 6 it is always possible to argue after the fact
that the communication could have been more effective. 47 The nature of a strict liability action based upon a failure to warn is, thus,
significantly different from the nature of a case involving a flawed
or an impure product and from that of a case involving a design

defect.
STRICT LIABILITY THEORY IN ILLINOIS

In Suvada v. White Motor Co., 48 the Illinois Supreme Court imposed liability without negligence on a manufacturer where a defective condition made the manufacturer's product unreasonably
dangerous to the user. Before Suvada, strict liability, liability without fault or negligence, was only applied in cases involving the
marketing and consumption of impure food.4"Public policy sup43. See Noel, supra note 23, at 265.
44. Lawson v. G. D. Searle & Co., 64 II. 2d 543, 557, 356 N.E.2d 779 (1976); Green,
Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation, 54 Tx. L. Rv.
1185, 1211 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Green); Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra
note 2, at 837.
45. Cf. Green, supra note 44 (suggestion that § 402A is a communicative tort).
46. Twerski, supra note 35, at 521-24.
47. Keeton, supra note 10, at 587; Noel, supra note 23, at 261. Contra Twerski, supra
note 35, at 514-17, 521-24.
48. 32 II. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965). In Suvada the brake system in a milk truck
failed and the truck collided with a bus. The collision caused personal injuries and property
damage. Id. at 614, 210 N.E.2d at 183. The truck owners alleged that the injuries and damage were the result of a defective condition in the brake system that had not changed since
the truck left the manufacturer. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the allegations in
the complaint stated a valid cause of action against the brake system manufacturer. Id. at
624, 210 N.E.2d at 189.
49. The sale and consumption of adulterated pork caused the illness for which the plaintiff in Wiedeman v. Keller, 171 Ill. 93, 49 N.E. 210 (1897), sought damages. Id. at 98, 49 N.E.
at 211. The question presented in Wiedeman was whether a retailer warrants that goods
sold for immediate consumption are free from all defects that may injure the purchaser's
health, or whether the vendor is relieved of responsibility as long as the vendor does not
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ported imposition of strict liability in impure food cases for the
following reasons: the public has an interest in human life and
health; manufacturers solicit the use of their products and represent them to be safe; and, it is equitable to assess a loss upon
0 The Suvada court
the one creating and profiting from the risk.5
determined, without discussion, that these same policy grounds
compelled imposition of strict liability whenever a defective condition makes any product unreasonably dangerous to a user."1 The

know of the product's defective condition and has used reasonable care to guard against
offering unwholesome products for sale. Id. at 95-96, 49 N.E. at 210. In discussing this issue,
the court acknowledged that the weight of authority in the United States recognized an
implied warranty of fitness for consumption when provisions were sold for domestic use. Id.
at 98, 49 N.E. at 211. The Wiedeman court found the consequences resulting from the
purchase of an unwholesome article of food to be potentially disastrous to human life and
health. Id. at 99, 49 N.E. at 211. The court, therefore, decided that public safety demanded
that retail food dealers be held liable for the sale of an unwholesome product. Id. Commenting that this rule may sound harsh, the court concluded that since the vendor is more able
to determine the soundness of the product than is the purchaser, it is safer to hold the
vendor liable than to force the consumer to assume the risk. Id.
In Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co., 318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E.2d 739 (1943), the plaintiff
sought to recover for the illness that an infant suffered after drinking adulterated milk that
the head of the household had purchased. Id. at 309, 47 N.E.2d at 741. The question in
Welter was whether the implied warranty recognized in Wiedeman would be extended to
protect a child of the purchaser. Id. at 317, 47 N.E.2d at 745. The court reached a result
that it considered to be conducive to public welfare when it ruled that the infant was covered by the implied warranty under the facts of the case. Id. at 322, 47 N.E.2d at 746-47.
Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E.2d 162 (1947) was a mousein-a-Coke-bottle case. Id. at 120, 74 N.E.2d at 163. The Patargiascourt considered whether
an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption would be imposed on manufacturers
of food products sold in sealed containers. Id. at 128, 74 N.E.2d at 167. In resolving this
question, the court reasoned that a modern manufacturer not only expects people to consume food while relying upon its apparent suitability for consumption, but intentionally
creates a demand for the product by using advertising to induce a belief that the product is
suitable for consumption. Id. at 131-32, 74 N.E.2d at 168-69. Continuing this reasoning, the
court concluded that to allow a manufacturer to benefit from this public confidence, and to
later avoid liability for injuries which result from the manufactuer's business activities,
would be to create a weakness in the law. Id. at 132, 74 N.E.2d at 169. The Patargiascourt
held that public policy demanded that an implied warranty of fitness for human consumption be imposed upon the manufacturer of any article of food or drink sold in a sealed
container. Id. at 133, 74 N.E.2d at 169.
In Tiffin v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E.2d 406 (1959), the Illinois Supreme Court again recognized that by selling food to the public, both a manufacturer and a
retailer impliedly warrant that the product is fit for human consumption. Id. at 56, 162
N.E.2d at 411. Consequently, either the manufacturer or the retailer may be required to
compensate an injured consumer. Id. The manufacturer and retail store in Tiffin were
granted a directed verdict not because the allegations of the complaint were faulty, but
because the plaintiffs failed to prove the elements alleged. Id. at 60, 162 N.E.2d at 413.
See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 6 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
50. 32 I11.2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965).
51. Id.
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court concluded that there was no reason for imposing strict liability in impure food cases and liability based on negligence in cases
involving other products."2
After deciding to hold the manufacturer liable without negligence, the Suvada court announced the elements of an action
based on strict liability in tort. To maintain a strict liability tort
action in Illinois, a plaintiff must prove that a condition of a product caused injury or damage, and that the condition was, unreasonably dangerous. Additionally, the plaintiff must establish that the
condition existed when the product left the manufacturer's control.5 3 When these elements are proven, the plaintiff may recover
without proving negligence."
Although the Suvada court recognized a strict products liability
action, it did not label the defect as one of manufacturing or design, nor did the opinion provide a standard for determining when
a product contains a defective condition which makes it unreasonably dangerous. Appellate court cases, nevertheless, interpreted
Suvada as a manufacturing defect case, and expanded that doctrine by imposing strict liability upon a manufacturer in cases, not
only when a manufacturing defect in a product caused injury, but
also when injury was caused by either a defectively designed product 55 or by a product that lacked adequate warnings. 66

52. Id.
53. Id. at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188.
54. Id.
55. Wright v. Massey-Harris, Inc., 68 Ill. App. 2d 70, 215 N.E.2d 465 (1966), was an
action to recover for injuries allegedly sustained because a cornpicker was not designed with
shields over the chain mechanism and shuckling rollers, areas of the machine in which corn
ears jammed. Id. at 72, 215 N.E.2d at 466. The Wright court interpreted Suvada to impose
liability for design defects as well as manufacturing defects. Id. at 79, 215 N.E.2d at 470.
The court, therefore, concluded that liability would be imposed if the product design created an unreasonably dangerous condition under the facts of the case. Id. Rephrasing the
question, the court asked whether the product design met the required standard of safety.
Id. The Wright court held that the complaint stated a valid cause of action in strict liability.
Id.
56. In Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries which occurred when the trencher he was operating struck an underground gas service
pipe, jumped backward out of control, knocked the plaintiff to the ground, and ran over
him. Id. at 352, 236 N.E.2d at 135. The complaint alleged that the trencher was in an unreasonably dangerous condition when it left the defendant's control because there was no warning on the machine that to operate the trencher from behind, between the handlebars, was
dangerous. Id. at 356, 236 N.E.2d at 137. The defendant moved for a directed verdict, arguing that there was no legal duty to place a warning on the machine. Id. at 360, 236 N.E.2d at
139. The court decided that when a manufacturer has reason to foresee danger as a result of
a particular product use, the manufacturer must give adequate warning of the danger or
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In Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 7 the Illinois Supreme Court first reviewed the various definitions of the term "defect" in the context of product liability law.58 The Dunham court
concluded that all of the definitions were based upon the common
premise that a product is defective when it fails to perform in the
manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature and intended function.5 9 The court imposed liability because the jury
could properly have concluded that, considering the length and
type of its use, the defective product involved failed to perform in
the manner that would reasonably have been expected. 60
After Dunham, it appeared that the imposition of strict liability
would be based on the existence of a defective, unreasonably dan-

accept liability for any damages. Id. The court then reasoned that strict liability applies
when injury results from the use of a product that does not have adequate warnings, since
the failure to warn may itself be the defect that causes injury. Id. It is not necessary that
the product be defective in any other way. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the Williams
court relied upon two failure to warn cases brought under negligence theories. In Biller v.
Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 47, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962), the court imposed a duty
to warn of the latent limitations of a perfectly made tractor because the tractor could be
dangerous to use if the user were ignorant of its limitations and had no reason to recognize
the dangers. Id. at 65, 180 N.E.2d at 55. In Kirby v. General Paving Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 453,
229 N.E.2d 777 (1967), the court summarized the general principles of law which determine
existence of a duty to warn: "[a] duty to warn exists where there is unequal knowledge,
actual or constructive, and the defendant, possessed of such knowledge, knows or should
know that harm might or could occur if no warning is given." Id. at 457, 229 N.E.2d at 779.
The Biller court relied upon Davidson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 171 Ill. App. 355
(1912), the first Illinois case to adopt an exception to the privity rule "[w]here one, without
giving notice of its qualities, sells or delivers an article which he knows to be imminently
dangerous to life and limb. . . ." Id. at 364. In Davidson, the defendant was held liable for
injuries resulting from the sale of a balance wheel for a saw frame represented to be safe
when, in fact, it was in a defective, dangerous condition. Id. at 367. For other negligence
cases brought under the Davidson exception to the privity rule, see Beadles v. Servel, Inc.,
344 Ill. App. 133, 100 N.E.2d 405 (1951) (refrigerator); Lindroth v. Walgreen Co., 338 11.
App. 364, 87 N.E.2d 307 (1949) (vaporizer), aff'd, 407 I11. 121, 94 N.E.2d 847 (1950)
(vaporizer); Lill v. Murphy Door Bed Co., 290 Ill. App. 328, 8 N.E.2d 714 (1937) (in-a-doorbed); Rotche v. Buick Motor Co., 358 Ill. 507, 193 N.E. 529 (1934) (automobile); Colbert v.
Holland Furnace Co., 333 Ill. 78, 164 N.E. 163 (1928) (cold air shaft floor grating).
See also Dunham v. Vaughn & Bushnell Mfg. Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 315, 323-27, 229 N.E.2d
684, 688-89 (1967), aff'd, 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969). See infra notes 57-61 and
accompanying text.
57. 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
58. The jury in Dunham decided that a hammer was defective because it chipped after
11 months of use, causing the plaintiff to lose sight in one eye. Id. at 340-41, 247 N.E.2d at
404. The court found the evidence sufficient to justify the imposition of strict liability although there was no production flaw in the hammer. Id. at 344, 247 N.E.2d at 404.
59. Id. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
60. Id.
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gerous condition as tested by the user's reasonable expectations. 1
6" 2 however, the
In Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital,
test for imposing strict liability was expressed differently. The
Cunningham test determines whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous by first assuming that the manufacturer had actual
knowledge of the condition of the particular product unit in question, and then asking whether a reasonable manufacturer would
63
have placed that unit on the market.
Cunningham involved a unit of whole blood contaminated with
hepatitis virus.6 The impurity of the product made it defective.'
At the time of the decision, it was not scientifically possible, either
theoretically or practically, to identify a contaminated unit of
blood before it was administered to a patient.6 6 The court held
that the concept of strict liability applied although the seller had
exercised all possible care, and was not at fault, either in creating7
the dangerous condition or in failing to discover and eliminate it.
Whether the defendant could even theoretically ascertain the existence of the defect was considered irrelevant.6 Since the court
found blood containing hepatitis virus to be, unquestionably, in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user, the court
concluded that the complaint adequately stated a strict liability
cause of action.6 9
The Cunningham decision is particularly significant because the
court imposed liability without fault despite the fact that a remedy
for the defect was beyond the state of the art.7 0 The court refused
to consider the manufacturer's inability to discover or know of a

61. Id.
62. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
63. Id. at 454, 266 N.E.2d at 903. The test adopted in Cunningham was originally proposed by Professor Wade. Id. In Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 525 P.2d 1033, 269 Or. 485,
the test was applied in a failure to warn case. See supra note 5.
64. 47 Ill. 2d at 445, 266 N.E.2d at 898.
65. Id. at 456, 266 N.E.2d at 904. In Greenberg v. Michael Reese Hosp., 83 Ill. 2d 282,
415 N.E.2d 390 (1980), the court refused to impose strict liability upon medical practitioners. The court distinguished Cunningham since the blood in Cunningham was "physical
material which was bad." Id. at 289, 415 N.E.2d at 394.
66. 47 Ill. 2d at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
67. Id. at 453-54, 266 N.E.2d at 902-03. After Cunningham the General Assembly passed
a statute that requires that a blood transfusion be considered a service for liability purposes.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 1 5101-5103 (1979) repealed by ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1111/2, 5104
(1981).
68. 47 Ill. 2d at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
69. Id. at 456-57, 266 N.E.2d at 904.
70. Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
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defect in a strict liability analysis.7 Since Cunningham involved
an impure product, a unit different from the rest of the product
line, it is similar to a manufacturing defect case. Nothing in the
court's opinion, however, suggested that the Cunningham liability
standard should be limited to flawed or impure products.7 2 The
manufacturer in Cunningham, unlike the manufacturer in a typical manufacturing defect case, could not possibly have reduced the
probability of producing a defective product, regardless of the
amount of care invested.7 The Cunningham court specifically
stated that to allow a defense to strict liability because it was theoretically or practically impossible for a defendant to identify impurities in a product would "signal a return to negligence theory. '74
Since Cunningham, however, the negligence concepts of "forseeability" and "reasonableness" have reappeared in Illinois Supreme Court strict products liability decisions. Although no single
decision signals a return to fault theory, the emerging case law ap75
pears to be injecting fault concepts into strict liability theory.
71. Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
72. 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
73. Id. at 455, 266 N.E.2d at 903.
74. Id. at 453, 266 N.E.2d at 902.
75. For example, the court adopted a forseeability requirement by holding that only
those individuals to whom injury from a defective product may reasonably be forseen and
who use the product in a reasonably foreseeable manner, may recover from a manufacturer.
In Winnett v. Winnett, 57 I11.
2d 7, 310 N.E.2d 1 (1974), the court dismissed the plaintiff's
complaint after deciding that it was not objectively reasonable to expect that a four-year-old
child would be permitted to approach an operating farm forage wagon and place her fingers
in the holes of its moving screen. Id. at 13, 310 N.E.2d at 5. The court concluded that
Suvada and Dunham established that a manufacturer has a duty to make a product reasonably fit for its intended use, but that a forage wagon was not intended to be used by a fouryear-old child. Id. at 9-10, 310 N.E.2d at 3. In Court v. Grzelinski, 72 Ill.
2d 141, 379 N.E.2d
281 (1978), the court held that a firefighter may recover in strict liability to the extent that
the firefighter is a person to whom injury from the product may reasonably be foreseen,
even though the injury occurs while he or she is fighting a fire as a public employee. Id. at
151, 379 N.E.2d at 285.
The court has also suggested that the underlying question of forseeability would define
the scope of the duty to warn in a strict liability case. In Genaust v. Illinois Power Co., 62
Ill. 2d 456, 343 N.E.2d 465 (1976), the plaintiff claimed that the antenna and the tower for a
citizens band radio were unreasonably dangerous because they did not have warnings that
would alert users to the danger of electrocution if either of the products were brought close
to a power line. Id. at 465, 343 N.E.2d at 468. The court dismissed these claims, holding that
a warning was not required when the product was not defectively designed or manufactured,
and when the possibility of injury resulted from a common and obvious product tendency.
Id. at 467, 343 N.E.2d 471. In reaching this decision, the court reasoned that the determination of whether a duty to warn exists is a question of law necessarily based upon the question of foreseeability. Id. at 466, 343 N.E.2d at 471. Foreseeability was defined as that which
it is objectively reasonable to expect. Id. The Genaust court relied upon Fanning v. LeMay,
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38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967), a case in which the plaintiff alleged that the defendants had failed to warn that shoes were slippery and dangerous to wear when wet. 62 Ill. 2d
at 467, 343 N.E.2d at 471. The complaint in Fanningwas dismissed because the court would
not require a manufacturer to warn of commonly recognized dangers. 38 Ill. 2d at 211, 230
N.E.2d at 185. The Genaust court also referred to comment j to § 402A of the RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS (1965). 62 Ill. 2d at 467, 343 N.E.2d at 471. Although the court acknowledged that, according to comment j, the failure to warn could make a product unreasonably
dangerous, the court decided not to recognize a failure to warn defect under the facts of
Genaust. Id.
Several other decisions hold that misuse is not a defense when it is reasonably foreseeable.
Thomas v. Kaiser Agricultural Chem., 81111. 2d 206, 407 N.E.2d 32 (1980), involved a defective adaptor that was incorporated into a fertilizer applicator and provided to the plaintiff
in connection with a fertilizer purchase. Id. at 209-10, 407 N.E.2d at 34. The plaintiff's face
was sprayed with liquid nitrogen fertilizer as he attempted to fill the applicator. Id. at 209,
407 N.E.2d at 34. The court rejected the supplier's argument that the use of the adaptor on
the applicator was misuse of the product, reasoning that the use was foreseeable, and that
foreseeable misuse would not bar the liability of the manufacturer. Id. at 216, 407 N.E.2d at
37. In Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979), the court found that since a
forage blower was not equipped with any mechanism to keep the power takeoff shaft above
the ground while the machine was moved, evidence supported the conclusion that the design
of the machine was impractical and could be expected to result in foreseeable misuse. Id. at
160, 390 N.E. 2d at 865. In Anderson v. Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (1979),
the court ruled that misuse would break the causal connection between the defective product and the plaintiff's injuries only when the misuse was not reasonably foreseeable, and
that the forklift operator's failure to step on the brake was not product misuse under the
circumstances. Id. at 369, 385 N.E.2d at 693.
Similarly, a reasonableness requirement has been incorporated by strict liability decisions
which hold that a defect exists only when those exposed to the product are subjected to an
unreasonable risk of harm. In Hunt v. Blasius, 74 II. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978), the
court held that a highway exit sign was not defective or unreasonably dangerous because it
did not "break-away" when a car collided with the sign post. Id. at 212, 384 N.E.2d at 372.
The intended use of the signpost did not require that the post break on impact. Id. The
court concluded that recovery is to be allowed only when injuries are the result of "a distinct defect in the product, a defect which subjects those exposed to the product to an
unreasonable risk of harm." Id. at 211, 384 N.E.2d at 372. The court also noted that the
availability of an alternative design does not translate into a legal duty to adopt that design.
Id. at 212, 384 N.E.2d at 372. Rios v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 59 II. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d
232 (1974), involved a punch press that was dangerous to use for secondary operations unless safety devices were installed. Id. at 83, 319 N.E.2d at 234-35. Although the plaintiff was
denied recovery because the evidence did not prove causation, the court's opinion emphasized that in order to establish strict liability in tort, a plaintiff must prove not only that a
product was dangerous, but that it was unreasonably dangerous, or not reasonably safe. Id.
In strict liability design cases, on the issue of whether the product was unreasonably dangerous, the court has permitted proof of the reasonableness of the manufacturer's design
choice by evidence of alternative designs and compliance with government regulations. In
Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 390 N.E.2d 859 (1979), the plaintiff alleged that the lack of
a device to secure the power takeoff assembly on a forage blower while the blower was being
moved was an unreasonably dangerous defect in design. Id. at 160-61, 390 N.E.2d at 862.
The unreasonably dangerous nature of the design was proved by presenting evidence of a
feasible alternative design. Id. at 164, 390 N.E.2d at 864. The court ruled that the evidence
of feasible alternative design was appropriately considered. Id. The court distinguished
Cunningham, a case in which the state of the art defense was rejected, because in Cunning-
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In Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co.,76 the Illinois Supreme Court
ham, the product itself was unreasonably dangerous, while in Kerns, the lack of a securing
mechanism allegedly made the product not reasonably safe. Id. at 161, 390 N.E.2d at 862-63.
The court decided that design safety was an issue to be determined by the factfinder. Id. In
Anderson v. Hyster Co., 74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690 (1979), the design of the control
pedals that operated a forklift truck was at issue. Id. at 367, 385 N.E.2d at 692. The court
determined that evidence of the availability and feasibility of alternative designs could be
used to prove that a product was not reasonably safe, by reason of defective design. Id. at
368, 385 N.E.2d at 692. Whether the defendant failed to design a reasonably safe product
was considered properly treated by the lower courts as a factual question for the jury; Id. at
369, 385 N.E.2d at 693. The dispute in Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Ill. 2d 434, 396
N.E.2d 534 (1979), involved a railroad car designed without a "headshield," a protective
device that would shield the car from damaging collisions. Id. at 437, 396 N.E.2d at 535-36.
The appellate court refused to admit evidence that even without a headshield the railroad
car design met federal requirements. Id. The court relied on Cunningham, reasoning that
the ability to detect a defect is not relevant in a strict liability case. Id. The Illinois Supreme Court cited Kerns v. Engelke, 76 Ill. 2d 154, 161, 390 N.E.2d 859, 862-63 (1979), the
case in which the court concluded that Cunningham did not preclude the plaintiff's introduction of feasible alternative designs when the plaintiff was attempting to prove a design
defect. Id. at 437-38, 396 N.E.2d at 536-37. The court then reasoned that a defendant
should, similarly, be allowed to show that an alternative design is not required by federal
regulation. 77 Ill. 2d at 438, 396 N.E.2d at 536.
76. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980). Before Woodill, Illinois appellate courts had
recognized that inadequate warnings could justify imposition of strict liability in tort. See
supra note 67. In Frisch v. International Harvester Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 507, 338 N.E.2d 90
(1975), the failure to warn both that pressure buildup and vibration could cause the gas
tank cap on a tractor to come loose, and that it was important that the cap be secured while
the tractor was in operation, allegedly caused a fire which burned the plaintiff. Id. at 515,
338 N.E.2d at 97. The court found the tractor defective, reasoning that products not otherwise defective are covered under the theory of strict liability if they are unaccompanied by
adequate warnings. Id. at 516, 338 N.E.2d at 97. In reaching this decision, the Frisch court
relied upon Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 93 Ill. App. 2d 334, 236 N.E.2d 125 (1968), rev'd on
other grounds, 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970), and upon the developing national trend
recognizing the failure to warn as a basis for strict liability in tort. Id. See supra note 67.
Illinois State Trust Co. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 73 Ill. App. 3d 585, 392 N.E.2d 70 (1979), involved safety jackstands that were improperly positioned and, consequently, failed to support a car being worked on by an automobile mechanic. Id. at 587, 392 N.E.2d at 71. The
court imposed a duty to warn, concluding that a product may be defective solely by its
failure to warn of dangers attending its use if the manufacturer knows or should know of the
danger, and the user does not have the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger. Id. at 589,
392 N.E.2d at 73.
Several opinions acknowledged that a product may be in a defective condition if sold
without adequate warnings when a manufacturer knows or should know that danger may
result from a particular product use. The courts in these cases concluded that the factfinder
must determine if the product was unreasonably dangerous, either because of a warning
defect or a design defect. Mahr. v. G. D. Searle & Co., 72 Ill. App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214
(1979); Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 II. App. 3d 241, 375 N.E.2d 1349 (1978); Neal v. Whirl Air
Flow Corp., 43 Ill. App. 3d 266, 356 N.E.2d 1173 (1976); Stanfield v. Medalist Indus. Inc., 34
Ill. App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975). In Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc., 50 I. App. 3d
1026, 366 N.E.2d 144 (1977), the court also acknowledged the possibility of a warning defect,
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defined the elements of a strict liability action based upon an allegedly inadequate warning. Woodill first presented the question
whether the failure to warn of a scientifically unknowable danger
in a pure product could serve as a basis for strict liability in Illinois.77 The court, in Cunningham, had imposed strict liability
when an impure product caused injury even though the manufacturer could not possibly have known of the product defect. 78 At the

time of the Woodill decision, the tension was apparent between
the concept of liability without fault as expressed in Cunningham,
and the premise that a defect exists only when a product is defective and unreasonably dangerous as developed in Dunham and the
post-Cunningham cases.79 Underlying this tension was the policy,
but ruled that an electric relay switch did not have a warning defect because the injuries to
the plaintiff were not reasonably foreseeable by the manufacturer.
Several decisions held either that no warning defect existed because a danger was obvious
or recognized by the plaintiff, or that the existence of a warning defect was a factual question because it was unclear whether the danger was obvious. In Weiss v. Rockwell Mfg. Co.,
9 11. App. 3d 906, 293 N.E.2d 375 (1973), the plaintiff alleged that he was injured while
using a wood shaper which was defective because the manufacturer did not adequately warn
that the tool would "push-up" boards manually fed into the cutters. Id. at 912, 293 N.E.2d
at 379. The court concluded that the parties were equally aware of the basic laws of physics,
and that since the operating property of the machine was readily apparent, no duty to warn
existed. Id. at 913, 293 N.E.2d at 379-80. Jonescue v. Jewel Home Shopping Serv., 16 Ill.
App. 3d 339, 306 N.E.2d 312 (1973), involved injuries sustained by a child who drank allpurpose cleaner. Id. at 343, 306 N.E.2d at 313. The court reversed the judgment directing a
verdict for the defendant because, based on the record, it was unclear whether the plaintiff's
injuries should have been recognized as an obvious consequence of ingesting the cleaner. Id.
at 347-48, 306 N.E.2d at 318. Similarly, because the plaintiff in Ostendorf v. Brewer, 51 111.
App. 3d 1009, 367 N.E.2d 214 (1977) testified that he knew that it was necessary to tightly
secure the gas cap after refueling a tractor, the court decided that no warning was required,
even though a failure to warn may constitute a product defect under other circumstances.
Id. at 1013-14, 367 N.E.2d at 217. In Zidek v. General Motors Corp., 66 II. App. 3d 982, 384
N.E.2d 509 (1978), the court refused to find an automobile unreasonably dangerous because
the manufacturer did not warn that a car will skid on ice. Id. at 985, 384 N.E.2d at 512. The
court concluded that the injury resulted from a common, obvious propensity of the product.
Id. In Fuller v. Fend-All Co., 70 Ill. App. 3d 634, 388 N.E.2d at 964 (1979), the plaintiff was
blinded when a piece of metal flew past the safety glasses he was wearing and into his eye.
Id. at 635, 388 N.E.2d at 965. Since the court found a dispute over whether the danger of
the use of glasses without side shields was obvious, the order granting summary judgment
for the defendant was reversed. Id. at 639, 388 N.E.2d at 968.
77. 79 Ill. 2d at 29, 402 N.E.2d at 196. In Lawson v. G. D. Searle & Co., 64 Ill. 2d 543,
356 N.E.2d 779 (1976), the court acknowledged that the adequacy of a warning may be the
central issue in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous. Id. at 551, 356
N.E.2d at 783. The Lawson court did not consider the effect that a scientifically unknowable
danger would have on the doctrine of strict liability. See also Note, Drug Reactions, supra
note 31, at 745.
78. 47 II. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970). See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 57-75 and accompanying text.
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first expressed in Suvada, that manufacturers should be responsible for defective products, but should not be made absolute insurers of product safety.80
The Factual Context
When Ellen Woodill was an obstetrical patient, her physician
prescribed Pitocin, a drug used to induce uterine contractions
which had been manufactured by Parke Davis & Co."' Ellen
Woodill's child, Eric, was born with brain damage, permanent
blindness, and quadriplegia. 82 At the time the drug was administered, the fetus was in high station."' This use of Pitocin was not
contraindicated
in any product information distributed by Parke
4
Davis & Co.8

Eric's parents brought suit to recover damages for the injuries
that he suffered. The Woodill's complaint included a strict liability
count against Parke Davis & Co.8" The count alleged that the
Parke Davis drug was "not reasonably safe" because the company
failed to warn "that the use of 'Pitocin' while a fetus is in high
station is a cause of brain damage in infants." 86 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss because the complaint
failed to state a cause of action.' 7 The dismissal order was affirmed
on appeal. 88 The appellate court held that since the Woodill's complaint did not allege that the defendant knew or should, have
known of the danger, the complaint was missing an essential element of a strict liability action based upon a failure to warn. 89
The Supreme Court Decision
In Woodill, the issue presented to the Illinois Supreme Court
was "whether, in an action seeking to hold a defendant strictly liable for failure to warn of a danger attendant to the use of a prod80. 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). See also Hunt v. Blasius, 74 I1. 2d
203, 211, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978); Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 600; Montgomery & Owen,
supra note 10, at 826; Traynor, supra note 2, at 366-67; Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 5, at 13; Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 828.
81. Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 29, 402 N.E.2d 194, 195 (1980).
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 349, 350, 374 N.E.2d 683, 684 (1978).
Id. at 354, 374 N.E.2d at 687.
Id. at 350, 374 N.E.2d at 685.
Id. at 356, 374 N.E.2d at 689.
Id. at 354, 374 N.E.2d at 687.
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uct, the plaintiff must allege and prove that the defendant knew or
should have known of the danger."9 The court concluded that
"the imposition of a knowledge requirement is a proper limitation
to place on a manufacturer's strict liability in tort predicated upon
a failure to warn of a danger inherent in a product."'"
The majority opinion in Woodill explained the basis for the decision to impose a knowledge requirement in strict liability failure
to warn cases. In resolving the knowledge requirement issue, the
court relied upon the Suvada opinion, which had cited with approval section 402A of the Restatement of Torts." Comment j to
section 402A provides that a seller must warn if "he has
knowledge, or by the application of reasonable, developed human
skill and forsight should have knowledge" of a danger.93 Although
the Woodill court recognized that not all courts which had considered the knowledge requirement issue had followed comment j,"
the court relied upon several decisions which suggest that knowledge is an essential element in a strict liability failure to warn
95

case.

90. 79 11. 2d 26, 29, 402 N.E.2d 194, 196 (1980).
91. Id. at 33, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
92. Id. at 31, 402 N.E.2d at 196-97.
93. Id. at 32, 402 N.E.2d at 197. See supra note 2.
94. 79 Ill. 2d at 32-33, 402 N.E.2d at 197.
95. 79 Ill.
2d at 33, 402 N.E.2d at 197-98. The following decisions are cited in the majority opinion: Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir. 1972); Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chem., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969); Mahr v. G. D. Searle & Co.,
72 Ill.
App. 3d 540, 390 N.E.2d 1214 (1979); Knapp v. Hertz Corp., 59 Ill.
App. 3d 241, 375
N.E.2d 1349 (1978); Peterson v. B/W Controls, Inc., 50 Ill.
App. 3d 1026, 366 N.E.2d 144
(1977); Neal v. Whirl Air Flow Corp., 43 Ill. App. 3d 266, 356 N.E.2d 1173 (1976); Stanfield
v. Medalist Indus., Inc., 34 Il.App. 3d 635, 340 N.E.2d 276 (1975); Nissen Trampoline Co.
v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (Ind.App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds,
265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d
1033 (1974); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978). The dissenting justices did not think that the cited decisions adequately supported the court's adoption of the
knowledge requirement. See infra note 120. The justices dismissed most of the cited cases
summarily, contending that those cases did not squarely face the issue. Id.
Only a few decisions have specifically considered the liability problems which arise when
an asserted failure to warn involves an unknowable danger. In Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural
Chem., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969), the court explicitly refused to impose
liability for unknowable dangers because the court did not wish to turn a manufacturer into
an insurer. Id. at 651, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 713. The decision was based on comment j. Id. at 64951, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. See infra note 120. In Ortho Pharmaceutical v. Chapman, 388
N.E.2d 541, 545-48 (Ind.App. 1979), the court concluded that the language of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A and its comments indicates that an exception from strict
liability was intended for prescription drugs, and that warnings were, therefore, required
only when a manufacturer knew or should have known of the risk. Relying on comment j,
the court in Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prod. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973),
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In rejecting the suggestion that its decision injected negligence
principles into strict liability law," the majority distinguished negligence theory from the theory of strict liability.9 7 In strict liability,
the court asserted, it is the product defect, rather than the conduct
of the manufacturer that establishes the cause of action." Despite
this articulated distinction, the court evaluated the product defect
in Woodill by reviewing the manufacturer's conduct. 9 To test the
adequacy of the warning the majority asked whether it would have
been reasonable for a manufacturer to have given a warning and
whether that warning would have been sufficient under similar circumstances. 00 The Woodill opinion explicitly stated, however, that
the consideration of reasonableness in determining whether a defective condition is unreasonably dangerous was not intended to
change a strict liability case into a negligence action.' 0 '

cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), stated that the requirement that a danger be scientifically
discoverable is an important limitation on a seller's liability. In Basko v. Sterling Drugs,
Inc., 416 F.2d 417, 426 (2d Cir. 1969), the court stated that there was no expectation that
the defendant warn of unknown dangers, but that when the risk became apparent, the duty
attached.
In other decisions, the possibility that the manufacturer could have warned of the danger
was not disputed. The opinions simply state that the law requires a warning when a seller
knows of a potential harm to a user because of the nature of the product, or that the seller is
liable because no warning was given when the risk was known. See, e.g., Ezagui v. Dow
Chem. Corp., 598 F.2d 727 (2d Cir. 1979); Givens v. Lederle, 556 F.2d 1341 (5th Cir. 1977);
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Al E. & C., Ltd., 539 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Singer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 461 F.2d 288 (7th Cir.
1972); Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483 (2d Cir. 1971); Craven v. Niagara Mach. & Tool
Works, Inc., 417 N.E.2d 1165 (Ind. App. 1981); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First
Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, (Ind. App. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358
N.E.2d 974 (1976); Lopez v. Aro Corp., 584 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); Bristol-Myers
Co. v. Gonzales, 561 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. 1978).
Many decisions view the manufacturer's disclosure in light of known dangers to be the
key to evaluating the adequacy of the warning. See, e.g., Brochu v. Ortho Mfg. Corp., 642
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1981); Lindsay v. Ortho Mfg. Corp., 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980); Dalke v.
Upjohn, 555 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1977); Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, 529 F.2d 457 (1976); Parke
Davis & Co. v. Stromsodt, 411 F.2d 1390 (8th Cir. 1969); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399
F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975);
Toole v. Richardson-Merrell Inc., 251 Cal. App. 2d 689 60 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1967); Tomer v.
American Home Prod. Corp., 170 Conn. 681, 368 A.2d 35 (1976); Cunningham v. Charles
Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975).
96. 79 Ill. 2d at 33, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
97. Id. at 33-34, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
98. Id. at 34, 402 N.E.2d at 198.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 34-35, 402 N.E.2d at 198. To make this point the court quoted the opinion in
Rucker v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 77 Il1. 2d 434, 439, 396 N.E.2d 534, 537 (1979) which states:
Any misapprehension that negligence is the standard of liability stems only from
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The majority also asserted that the knowledge requirement was
not intended to weaken the precedent established in Cunningham
102
v. MacNeal Memorial Hospital.
The Cunningham court had imposed liability without regard to the manufacturer's fault or knowledge.10 3 In Woodill, the court distinguished Cunningham, emphasizing that Cunningham involved a product which was defective
because it was impure, not because it lacked warnings.10 4 The
Woodill knowledge requirement was expressly limited to complaints which allege that a product is unreasonably dangerous because it lacks adequate warnings.10 5
The court reasoned that a rule which requires a plaintiff to plead
and prove that a manufacturer knew or should have known of the
danger which caused the injury, and that the manufacturer failed
to adequately warn of that danger, placed a logical limit on the
scope of the manufacturer's liability and was completely consistent
with the principles of strict liability adopted in Suvada.10 6 As
stated in Suvada, strict liability does not make a manufacturer an
absolute insurer.10 7 The Woodill court concluded that if a manufacturer were liable for failure to warn of a unknowable danger, the
manufacturer would be an insurer and the warning would be a
meaningless exercise.'08
The Dissenting Opinion
The three dissenting justices would not have limited a manufacturer's liability for inadequate warnings to situations in which the
manufacturer knew or had reason to know of a danger associated

the injection of a 'reasonableness' element in determining whether a defective condition is unreasonably dangerous. As Prosser states a strict liability design case
resembles a negligence action because the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
design choice is a key issue (Prosser, Torts sec. 96, at 644-45 (4th ed. 1971)). Despite the resemblance, however, the elements of the plaintiff's proof remain those
of an action in strict liability.
102. 79 Ill. 2d at 35-36, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
103. 47 ll. 2d at 443, 453, 266 N.E.2d 897.
104. 79 Ill. 2d at 36, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
105. Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
106. Id. at 35, 402 N.E.2d at 198-99.
107. 32 Ill. 2d at 623, 210 N.E.2d at 188. Interpreting Suvada, the Woodill court stated:
"Strict liability is not the equivalent of absolute liability." 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at
199. The court acknowledged that when an injury is not objectively predictable, or when a
plaintiff assumes the risk of injury, the manufacturer is absolved from liability. Id. See also
Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 600; Traynor, supra note 2, at 366; Wade, Strict Liability for
Products, supra note 2, at 828.
108. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199-299 (1980).
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with the product. The dissent would have allowed recovery, regardless of the manufacturer's lack of knowledge, where the consumer
was exposed to an unreasonably dangerous product. 0 9
In support of this position, the dissenting justices suggested that
there is a conflict between the language of Restatement section
402A, which holds a seller liable even though "the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product," 0 and comment j of that same section. Comment j, relied
upon by the majority, provides that a seller must give a warning
only if "he has knowledge, or by application of reasonable developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge" of a danger.' The dissent asserted that the language of the rule should
supercede the language of the comment." 2 The dissenting opinion
also noted that Restatement section 388, which states the negligence standard for the duty to warn, expressly conditions liability
upon the supplier's knowledge or reason to know of the danger." s
According to the dissenting justices, the majority decision replaced
the strict liability standard with a negligence standard in actions
based on a failure to warn.""
The dissenting justices argued that strict liability is distinguished from negligence only when the inquiry into the adequacy
of the warnings focuses on the condition of the product rather than
on the knowledge or conduct of the manufacturer." 5 The position
advocated by the dissent was first adopted by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co." 6 The analysis used by
the Phillips court was based on the premise that a product "can
have a degree of dangerousness because of a lack of warning which
the law of strict liability will not tolerate" even though the manufacturer acted reasonably in selling the product without a warn109. Id. at 43, 402 N.E.2d at 202.
110. 79 Il. 2d at 39, 402 N.E.2d at 200. See supra notes 1 & 4.
111. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment j (1965). See supra note 4.
112. 79 Ill. 2d at 39, 402 N.E.2d at 200.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id., at 39-40, 402 N.E.2d at 201-02. The distinction is summarized by the dissent as
follows:
In strict liability it is of no moment what defendant 'had reason to believe.' Liability arises from 'sell(ing) any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.' It is the unreasonableness of the condition of the
product, not of the conduct of the defendant, that creates liability. Dougherty v.
Hooker Chemical Corp., 540 F.2d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 1976), quoting Jackson v.
Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974).
116. 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974).
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ing. 117 The Phillips test, like the Cunningham test,"' assumed
that the manufacturer knew of the product's propensity to injure
as it did, and then asked, whether, with that knowledge, the manufacturer would have been negligent in selling the product without a
warning." 9 Under the Phillips test, the manufacturer's actual or
constructive knowledge of a danger is irrelevant. 2 0 It is assumed
117. Id. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039.
118. 47 111.2d at 454, 266 N.E.2d.at 903.
119. 269 Or. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039.
120. The dissent dismissed the decisions cited by the majority in support of the knowledge requirement. With two exceptions, the cited cases were disregarded because they did
not squarely face the issue. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 40, 402 N.E.2d 194, 201 (1980). See supra note 95.
Oakes v. Geigy Agricultural Chem., 272 Cal. App. 2d 645, 77 Cal. Rptr. 709 (1969), was
disregarded not because the case failed to confront the issue, but because the dissenting
justices believed that the California Supreme Court cast doubt on Oakes validity when the
court decided Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972), and Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
79 Il. 2d at 40, 402 N.E.2d at 201. No court has determined the vitality of Oakes since
Cronin and Barker were decided. A survey of California failure to warn cases, however, does
not lead to the conclusion that the courts of that state would adopt the view that a manufacturer's knowledge is irrelevant in a failure to warn case. For example, in Crane v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 218 Cal. App. 2d 855, 32 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963), warnings for a surface
preparer manufactured without defect were required under the law of strict liability. The
court approved an instruction which stated that warnings must be given when the manufacturer knows or should know of a danger which the user of the product would not ordinarily
discover. Id. at 860-61, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 757. In Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal.
App. 2d 44, 55, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552, 558 (1965), the court ruled that information sufficient to
decide that a supplier of dynamite fuses had no duty to provide a warning on the subject of
burning time was not available. The court's discussion of the duty to warn stated that the
supplier of a faultlessly made product may be subject to strict liability if it is unreasonably
dangerous to place the product in the hands of a user without providing a suitable warning.
Id. at 53, 46 Cal. Rptr. at 558. The court in Oakes sustained a demurrer because the complaint did not allege that the manufacturer knew or should have known that a weed-killing
chemical could cause an allergic skin reaction. 272 Cal. App. 2d 646-47, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 710.
In addition to relying upon Crane and Canifax, the Oakes court referred to comment j to §
402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965), and to a series of older cases decided
under the law of negligence. Id. at 649-51, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 712-13. Several subsequent cases
adopted the reasoning of the Oakes decision. Skaggs v. Clairol Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 1, 6, 85
Cal. Rptr. 584, 587 (1970); Christofferson v. Kaiser Found. Hosp., 15 Cal. App. 3d 75, 79, 92
Cal. Rptr. 825, 827 (1971); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 987, 988, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381,
400 (1970). In Midgley v. S. S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 74, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217, 221
(1976), the court commented that Oakes survives Cronin to the extent that there is a valid
distinction between "known" and "unknownable" dangers. In Cavers v. Cushman Motor
Sales, Inc., 95 Cal. App. 3d 338, 157 Cal. Rptr. 142 (1979), the court explicitly reviewed
Canifax in light of both Cronin and Barker. The Cavers court concluded that a consideration of degrees of danger cannot be eliminated from a failure to warn case, and that the
feasibility of including a warning is a factor to be considered in deciding whether the absence of a warning makes a product defective. Id. at 348-49, 157 Cal. Rptr. at 149. An instruction which stated that a product is defective if the absence of a warning makes it substantially dangerous to the user was approved. Id.
The dissenting justices in Woodill also agreed that Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269
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that the manufacturer always knows of all dangers associated with
the product. 2 ' The only pertinent question is whether the product
subjects the consumer to an unreasonable risk of harm.122 Applying
the Phillips reasoning, the dissent concluded that if an injured
person's recovery is conditioned upon pleading and proving that a
manufacturer knew or had reason to know of a danger, elements of
negligence are injected into the strict liability cause of action. 123
In addressing the majority's concern that warnings would be
124
meaningless exercises were the knowledge element eliminated,
the dissent proposed that warnings disclose the circumstances
under which a product had been found to be safe.' 25 The dissent
suggested that such disclosure might enable a manufacturer to
avoid liability for harm caused by an unknowable danger inherent
in the product.' s6 According to the dissenting opinion, such disclosure might protect a manufacturer from liability; thus, removal of
the knowledge element would not make the manufacturer an insurer. 117 The dissent argued that strict liability should be available
to the unsuspecting consumer, in fact, not just in theory."2

Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974), faced the knowledge issue, but did not believe the case can be
interpreted to support the majority position. It seems difficult to dispute this contention
since the Phillips decision is often considered to be the leading case recognizing the possibility that a product could be unreasonably dangerous even though the failure to warn was
entirely reasonable in light of the manufacturer's knowledge at the time that he or she sold
the product. Id. at 498, 525 P.2d at 1039. See supra note 6.
121. See supra note 6. See also Note, Product Liability Reform Proposals: The State of
the Art Defense, 43 ALBANY L. REV. 941, 958-60 (1979); Note, State of the Art Defense,
supra note 31, at 919-25.
122. This position has been adopted by the states in which a manufacturer is held
strictly liable for the inadequate warnings on a product, regardless of the scientific possibility of discovering the danger. See supra note 5.
123.

79 Ill. 2d at 44, 402 N.E.2d at 203.

124.

Id. at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 200.

125.

Id. at 44, 402 N.E.2d at 203.

126. Id. As a practical matter the consumer may be better informed by a warning of the
dangers associated with the product's use than by a catalog of circumstances under which
the product has been found to be safe. The manufacturer, as an expert, is best equipped to
evaluate the circumstances under which the product should not be used. If a manufacturer
were absolved from liability whenever a consumer's use deviated from the listed safe circumstances, the consumer, the person least able to assess the safety of a specific product
use, would be forced to assume the risk. See generally Twerski, supra note 35.
127.

79 I11.2d at 44, 402 N.E.2d at 203.

128.

Id. at 43, 402 N.E.2d at 202.
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ANALYSIS

The Nature of the Failure to Warn Defect
The apparent inconsistency between the Woodill and Cunningham decisions reflects an important development in Illinois product liability law. In Cunningham, a case in which an impure product caused injury, strict liability was imposed regardless of the
impossibility of identifying the product defect. 129 In Woodill, a
failure to warn case, the court refused to impose strict liability unless the plaintiff proved that the danger which resulted in the alleged product defect was scientifically knowable. '30 Without articulating the basis for the distinction, the Woodill court implicitly
recognized that the nature of an impurity or a manufacturing defect is fundamentally different from that of a warning defect, and
that different standards are needed to determine whether a particular type of defective condition is unreasonably dangerous.
The distinction implicitly acknowledged by the Woodill court is
supported by the inherent characteristics of each defect type.
When a product is impure or has a manufacturing flaw, only a limited number of units are defective. ' Because those defective units
do not meet normal quality standards, they can be identified objectively by physically comparing different units of the same product line.132 The manufacturer knowingly sets the standard by
which the defective products are identified.13 3 If a manufacturer
maintains stringent quality control standards, the manufacturer's
risk of incurring liability for injury resulting from a flawed product
can be minimized."3 " In this situation it is realistic to focus on the
physical product defect and to assess liability based solely on the
condition of the product.
It is not realistic to assess liability based solely on the condition
of the product in a failure to warn case. Warnings serve two purposes. They reduce the risk associated with the use of a product,
and shift legal responsibility for harm caused by the product's use
from the manufacturer to the user.1 3 5 Warnings function by alert129.

47 Ill. 2d 443, 453, 266 N.E.2d 897, 902 (1970).

130. 79 Ill. 2d 26, 37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980).
131. See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 11.
133. Id.
134. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 647.
135. Palmer v. Avco Distrib. Corp., 82 Ill. 2d 211, 221, 412 N.E.2d 959, 964 (1980). See
Kidwell, The Duty to Warn: A Descriptionof the Model of Decision, 53 Tax. L. REV. 1375
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ing the user to the importance of handling the product as instructed and to the possibility that the user may be harmed if the
warning is ignored. 36 An effective warning communicates the manufacturer's knowledge of dangerous product characteristics to the
user, so that the user can modify his or her conduct and reduce the
13 7
risks associated with the use of the product.
In a failure to warn case the alleged unreasonably dangerous
condition is an ineffective transfer of information. To assess the
adequacy of a warning, a court essentially must evaluate the effectiveness of a communication.13 8 There is no physical product defect
or condition upon which to focus as there is in a case based on a
manufacturing or design defect. A viable test for the adequacy of a
communication cannot focus on a product and ignore the knowledge and conduct of the manufacturer and user. Unless both the
manufacturer and the user appreciate the dangers associated with
the use of the product, the user cannot modify his or her conduct
in a manner which reduces risks. Unless the user has the opportunity to modify his or her conduct based on information contained
in the warning, the warning serves no purpose. If a danger is truly
unknowable, based on the present state of human knowledge, the
only way in which a user could modify his or her conduct to reduce
the risk would be to avoid using the product at all. Certainly, the
user cannot make an informed decision to accept the risks associated with the use of a product when those risks are unknowable.
Warnings by their nature, must be evaluated using a reasonableness standard rather than an absolute liability standard.
The Failure to Warn Product Liability Action
The Woodill court adopted a special pleading requirement for
strict liability complaints which allege that a product lacks adequate warnings. 1 9 After Woodill, to maintain a strict liability action based on inadequate warnings, a plaintiff must allege and
prove that the injury or damage was proximately caused by a product's inadequate warning, that the defendant knew or should have
known of the danger that caused the injury or damage, that the
inadequate warnings made the product unreasonably dangerous,

(1975) [hereinafter cited as Kidwell]; Tweraki, supra note 35.
136. Kidwell, supra note 135; Twerski, supra note 35, at 510, 514, 519, 521.
137. Twerski, supra note 35.
138. Cf. Green, supra note 44.
139. 79 Ill. 2d at 37, 402 N.E.2d at 199.
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and that the warnings were inadequate when the product left the
manufacturer's control.1 40 Except for the knowledge requirement,
the elements of proof in the Woodill failure to warn action are
identical to those of a traditional strict liability action.1 4 1 Yet, the
strict liability label is inappropriate because the Woodill action replaces the Cunningham absolute strict liability standard, the standard which imputes knowledge to the manufacturer, with a knowledge requirement which incorporates the reasonableness standard
usually associated with negligence actions. The failure to warn issue, framed in negligence terms, is whether the defendant
breached a duty to warn because there was unequal actual or constructive knowledge between the parties and the defendant knew
or should have known that harm could occur if no warning were
given."" By adding a knowledge requirement to the strict liability
action, the Woodill court developed a hybrid action not accurately
described by either a strict liability or negligence label.
PRODUCT SAFETY STANDARD

In a negligence action, the plaintiff must prove not only that the
product was unsafe, but that the manufacturer acted negligently in
creating or failing to discover the unsafe condition. 4 In a strict
liability case, the plaintiff is only required to prove that the product was unsafe. 44 This distinction between the actions may be
more theoretical than real, however, for a manufacturer's negligent
conduct may often be inferred from the unreasonably dangerous
condition of the product.
Because product safety is relative, a balancing process must be
used to decide whether a product is sufficiently safe.'4 5 Among the
factors considered, are the overall product utility, the likelihood
that the product will cause injury, the probable seriousness of that
injury, the availability of a safer substitute product which would
meet the same need, the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the
unsafe product characteristic without impairing the product's use140. Id. Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 IMI.2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965). See
supra notes 48-54.
141. See supra note 140.
142. Baylie v. Swift Co., 27 III. App. 3d 1031, 1042, 327 N.E.2d 438 (1975); Kirby v.
General Paving Co., 86 Ill. App. 2d 453, 457, 229 N.E.2d 777 (1967); Biller v. Allis Chalmers
Mfg. Co., 34 Il1.App. 2d 47, 65, 180 N.E.2d 46 (1962). See supra note 56.
143. See supra note 142. Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 553, 569.
144. See supra note 140. Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 553, 569.
145. Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 570.
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fulness or making it too expensive, the obviousness of the risk, and
the user's ability to avoid the danger by carefully using the product. 14 6 These same factors are weighed both in a strict liability action and in a negligence action. 147 Whether a failure to warn suit is
in strict liability or negligence, the same product safety standard
48
applies.1
The Model Uniform Product Liability Act consolidates negligence and strict liability theories of recovery into a single product
liability action."19 For a claim based on an inadequate warning the
146. Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 836-38.
147. Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers,supra note 5, at 17; Wade, Strict Liability
for Products, supra note 2, at 837. See also Montgomery & Owen supra note 10, at 818. Cf.
UPLA, supra note 14, at 62,714 (Model Act considers only user safety factors, not product
utility).
148. In Smith v. E. R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 405 Mich. 79, 273 N.W.2d 476 (1978), the
court concluded that the issue in a warning case is reasonable care, regardless of whether
the pleadings were based on negligence or on strict liability theory. Accord Lindsay v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical, 637 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1980); Werner v. Upjohn, 628 F.2d 848 (4th Cir. 1980);
Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1978); Karjala v. JohnsManville Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975); Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories Inc., 498
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Yarrow, 408 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1969); Davis
v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Stanback v. Parke Davis & Co.,
502 F. Supp. 767 (W.D. Va. 1980); Goodson v. Searle Laboratories, 471 F. Supp. 546 (D.
Conn. 1978); Chambers v. G. D. Searle & Co., 441 F. Supp. 377 (D. Md. 1975); Wolfgruber v.
Upjohn Co., 52 N.Y. 2d 768, 423 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1979), aff'd, 436 N.Y.S.2d 614 (1980).
Other courts have recognized that a product's defectiveness is dependent upon the same
considerations upon which a finding of negligence is based. Hohlenkamp v. Rheem Mfg. Co.,
601 P.2d 298 (Ariz. App. 1979); Shell Oil Co. v. Gutierrez, 581 P.2d 271 (Ariz. App. 1978).
Commentators have also concluded that there are no relevant factors which distinguish
strict liability and negligence in a duty to warn context. Keeton, supra note 10, at 586-87;
Kidwell, supra note 135, at 1377-79; McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries:
An Excursion Through the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability,
25 WAYNE L. REV. 1, 2, 5 (1978); Merrill, Compensationfor PrescriptionDrug Injuries, 59
VA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1973); Wade, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, supra note 5, at 17;
Wade, Strict Liability for Products, supra note 2, at 836-37, 842; Wade, Design Defects,
supra note 13, at 552. Contra Montgomery & Owen, supra note 10, at 829.
See infra notes 157-59 and accompanying text. It is important to note that at the time
Woodill was decided, a plaintiff was required to plead freedom from contributory negligence
if the suit was based on negligence theory. This element was not part of a strict liability
action. In Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981) the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted pure comparative negligence. A plaintiff is no longer required to base a case on
strict liability theory to avoid the contributory negligence bar.
149. UPLA, supra note 14, at 62,719. The Model Uniform Product Liability Act drafted
by the Department of Commerce suggested uniform standards for state product liability
tort law. Id. at 62,716. The Model Act is an effort to clarify the legal rights and obligations
of both product users and sellers. Id. Clarification is achieved by consolidating negligence
and strict liability theories of recovery into a single product liability claim. Id. at 62,719.
The Model Act assesses liability on a fault basis in duty to warn cases and limits the application of strict liability to cases involving construction or manufacturing defects. Id. at
62,722. The Model Act, thus, explicitly recognizes the distinction between warning defects

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 13

Model Act adopts a product safety standard which includes the
knowledge requirement.'"0 The drafter's analysis explicitly states
that "the duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions cannot go beyond the technological and other information that was
reasonably available at the time of manufacture.''

s5

Liability is

imposed under the Model Act if "the manufacturer should and
could have provided the instructions or warnings which.

. .

would

have been adequate."''
By incorporating the knowledge requirement, the Woodill court
adopted a product safety standard which is consistent with the
standard imposed by the Model Act. The court, however, expressly
refused to combine the strict liability and negligence failure to
warn actions into a single claim.' as As a result of the Woodill decision, in Illinois, a failure to warn case may carry a strict liability
label or a negligence label, but the label will not effect the applicable product safety standard.'5 The Woodill decision establishes
two causes of action, strict liability and negligence, which apply
and manufacturing defects which was implicit, but unarticulated, in the Woodill court's discussion of the Cunningham decision.
150. Id. at 62,724.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 62,721. The Model Act provides in pertinent part:
(C) The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because Adequate Warnings or Instructions Were Not Provided.
(1) In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe because
adequate warnings or instructions were not provided about a danger connected
with the product or its proper use, the trier of fact must find that, at the time of
manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or
similar harms and the seriousness of those harms rendered the manufacturer's
instructions inadequate and that the manufacturer should and could have provided the instructions or warnings which claimant alleges would have been
adequate.
(2) Examples of evidence that is especially probative in making this evaluation
include:
(a) The manufacturer's ability, at the time of manufacture, to be aware of
the product's danger and the nature of the potential harm;
(b) The manufacturer's ability to anticipate that the likely product user
would be aware of the product's danger and the nature of the potential
harm;
(c) The technological and practical feasibility of providing adequate
warnings and instructions;
(d) The clarity and conspicuousness of the warnings or instructions that
were provided; and
(e) The adequacy of the warnings or instructions that were provided.
153. See supra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
154. See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text.
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the same safety standard to a single set of facts.'" This multiplicity of actions shifts the focus of the litigation away from the ultimate fact question, the product safety standard, to peripheral legal
distinctions. I' Although both actions apply the same safety standard, available defenses, jury instructions, and statutes of limitation may differ.
DEFENSES, JURY INSTRUCTIONS, AND STATUTES OF LIMITATION

The defenses available in a strict liability action were unquestionably different from the defenses available in a negligence action at the time the Woodill case was decided. At that time, contributory negligence was not a bar to recovery in a suit based on
strict liability theory, but was a complete bar to recovery in a suit
based on negligence theory.1 5 7 Since Woodill was decided, however,
Illinois adopted pure comparative negligence.158 Illinois courts have
not yet determined whether comparative negligence will be applied
to strict liability actions. If Illinois follows the majority position,
comparing the conduct of the plaintiff and defendant in both strict
liability and negligence cases,159 available defenses will no longer
distinguish a strict liability failure to warn case from a negligence
failure to warn case.
In a failure to warn case, as in any case, a party is entitled to
instructions explaining each legal theory supported by the evidence.16 0 The Woodill strict liability instructions ask whether the
product lacked adequate warnings."' Negligence instructions ask
whether the defendant failed to adequately warn the plaintiff of

155. Id.
156. Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 577. Green, supra note 44, at 1187.
157. Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Kerns v. Lenox
Mach. Co., 74 111. App. 3d 194, 392 N.E.2d 688, (1979); Verdinck v. Feeding, 56 Ill. App. 3d
575, 371 N.E.2d 1109 (1977); Stammer v. General Motors Corp., 123 Il1. App. 2d 316, 259
N.E.2d 352 (1970).
158. Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981).
159. Note, Washington Refuses to Allow Comparative Negligence to Reduce a Strict
Liability Award, 56 WASH. L. REV. 307, 308 (1981); Note, Assumption of the Risk as the
only Affirmative Defense Available in Strict Products Liability Actions in Oregon: Barcelleri v. Hyster Co., 17 WILLAmErrE L. REV. 495, 495 (1981). See generally Brewster, Comparative Negligence in Strict Liability Cases 42 J. AIR L. COM. 107 (1976); Noel, Defective
Products; Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of Risk, 25 VAND. L.
REV. 93 (1972); Sales, Assumption of the Risk and Misuse in Strict Tort Liability-Prelude
to Comparative Fault, 11 TEx. TECH. L. REV. 729 (1980).
160. Ervin v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 65 Il. 2d 140, 145, 357 N.E.2d 500, 503 (1976).
161. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
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dangers associated with the product.'
In practice, a jury may
reach a different verdict after relying upon different sets of in13
structions which attempt to articulate one safety standard.

The difference in the statute of limitations is another important
practical distinction between strict liability and negligence causes
of action. In Illinois, a plaintiff usually cannot assert a strict liability claim more than twelve years after the product is sold by the
first seller in the distribution chain or ten years after the product
is first purchased by a consumer.'" Because negligence claims
must be filed within two years after an injury is discovered, the
statute of limitations for a negligence action may be longer or
shorter than that for a strict liability action depending upon when
65
the injury is discovered.
By adopting a knowledge requirement, the Woodill decision creates an action in which the ultimate issue, the product safety stan-

162. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
163. Freund v. Cellofilm Properties, Inc., 87 N.J. 229,244, 432 A.2d 925 (1981). "Instructing a jury that weighing factors concerning conduct and judgment must yield a conclusion that does not describe conduct is confusing at best." See also Birnbaum supra note 2,
at 648.
164. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 13-213 (1981).
The statute provides in pertinent part:
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsections (c) and (d) no product liability action based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort shall be commenced except
within the applicable limitations period and, in any event, within 12 years from
the date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession by a seller or 10 years from the
date of first sale, lease or delivery of possession to its initial user, consumer, or
other non-seller, whichever period expires earlier, of any product unit that is
claimed to have injured or damaged the plaintiff, unless the defendant expressly
has warranted or promised the product for a longer period and the action is
brought within that period.
The general rule is modified as follows:
(d) Notwithstanding, the provisions of subsections (b) and (c)(2) if the injury
complained of occurs within any of the periods provided by subsections (b) and
(c)(2) hereof, the plaintiff may bring suit within 2 years after the date on which
the claimant knew, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have known,
of the existence of the personal injury, death or property damage, but in no event
shall such action be brought more than 8 years after the date on which such personal injury, death or property damage occurred. In any such case, if the person
entitled to bring the action was, at the time the personal injury, death or property
damage occurred, under the age of 18 years, or insane, or mentally ill, or imprisoned on criminal charges, the period of limitations does not begin to run until the
disability is removed.
165. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 13-202 (1981). If property damage, rather than personal
injury is involved, the applicable limitation period is five years. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110,1 13205 (1981). See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 IlM.2d 161, 171, 421 N.E.2d 864, 86869 (1981); Witherell v. Weimer, 85 IMI.2d 146, 156, 421 N.E.2d 869, 874 (1981). See also
Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 1. 2d 407, 415, 430 N.E.2d 976, 980 (1982).
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dard, is substantially the same as in a negligence failure to warn
action. 166 If Illinois decides to apply comparative negligence principles in strict liability actions, the Woodill failure to warn action
will be different from a negligence action only because instructions
which attempt to articulate the same safety standard are worded
differently, and because different statutes of limitation apply. 16 7 A
single product liability action as proposed in the Model Act, would
eliminate the distraction and confusion of multiple legal theories
and would allow a trial to clearly focus on the real issue: determination of the appropriate product safety standard. "8
CONCLUSION

A warning is a communication, not a physical product condition
or characteristic. The Woodill court implicitly recognized this distinction and developed an appropriate failure to warn product liability action. The failure to warn action adopted in Woodill is a
hybrid action not accurately described by either the strict liability
or negligence label. The action incorporates concepts traditionally
associated with negligence, but is framed in strict liability terms.
Having defined this action in Woodill, the Illinois Supreme Court
should now formally combine the strict liability and negligence
failure to warn actions into one product liability action, as suggested in the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. A single product liability action would allow factfinders to focus on the basic
safety standards at issue.
SHERYL ANN MARCOUILLER

166.
167.
168.

See supra notes 139-56 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.
Wade, Design Defects, supra note 13, at 577. See supra note 156 and accompanying

